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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PONDEROSA ONE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
a Utah limited partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN SANITARY 
DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant submits to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah the following Brief. (A complete copy of Section 78-12-31, 
U.C.A. and Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P2d 338 (1980) is included 
in the Appendix.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
(A) Whether the sewer service fee imposed on appellant by 
respondent is a tax, and 
(B) If the sewer service fee is not a tax, does the 
six-month statute of limitations of Section 78-12-31 U.C.A. apply 
to the bringing of actions by customers of an improvement district 
to recover sewer service fees paid under protest. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 860448 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a suit by plaintiff-appellant to recover monies 
paid under protest to an improvement district/ for sewer service 
fees charged for which no service was rendered. (Record, p.1-4.) 
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Record, 
p.9) on the basis that Plaintiff had not filed its Complaint within 
the statutory six-month period for recovery of taxes as provided in 
Section 78-12-31 U.C.A. The court granted Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Record, p.16) on the basis that it could not 
distinguish between this case and the case known as Rupp v. 
Grantsville City, 610 P2d 338 (1980) in which a sewer CONNECTION 
fee was treated as a tax. 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Judgment in the District 
Court and an Order remanding the case to the trial court for a 
hearing on the merits, on the rationale that a sewer service fee is 
not a tax. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a building contractor, who constructed an 
apartment complex on the Northeast corner of 7th West and 3900 
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Respondent is an improvement district, as authorized by 
Section 17-6-1 et seq. U.C.A. 
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In May of 1985, Respondent sent Appellant a statement for 
sewer service to Appellant's apartment complex. Construction 
of the apartment complex was not complete, there were no tenants 
occupying apartments, and sewer service was not being used. 
Appellant paid the sewer service fee under protest on June 24, 
1985, and filed its Complaint for recovery of the fee on March 2, 
1986. 
Respondent moved the trial court for Summary Judgment on 
the basis that the action was barred by Section 78-12-31, U.C.A., 
which provides for a six-month statute of limitation for recovery 
of taxes paid under protest. 
The District Court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, from which Appellant makes this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Sewer service fees are not taxes and this court has so 
held. Therefore, the six-month statute of limitations for payments 
of taxes under protest should not apply to this case or the payment 
of sewer service fees. 
Respondents theory that sewer service fees are taxes, is 
based upon Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P2d 338, in which a sewer 
CONNECTION fee was treated as a tax. Sewer connection fees may be 
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an exercise of the police power of a cityf but sewer service fees 
certainly are not. 
Repondents rationale ignores the dichotomy betweem police 
functions of cities and proprietary functions of improvement 
districts. 
ARGUMENT 
SEWER SERVICE FEES ARE NOT TAXES AND THEREFORE 
NOT GOVERNED BY SECTION 78-12-31. 
Appellant opposed Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
in the District Court on the sole basis that the sewer service fees 
are not taxes and therefore Section 78-12-31/ U.C.A., does not 
apply to this case. (Record/ p.15.) 
The pertinent provision of Section 78-12-31 relied upon by 
Respondent is: 
Within six months: 
An action against an officerf or an officer de facto: 
• * * 
(2) For money paid to any officer under protest/ 
or seized by such officer in his official capacity/ 
as a collector of taxes, and which/ it is claimed/ 
ought to be refunded. (Underlining supplied.) 
In Murray City v. Board of Education of Murray City School 
District/ 16 Utah 2d 115 (1964)/ this Court denied the characteri-
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zation of a sewer service fee and connection fee as a revenue 
measure and stated that such charges are neither taxes nor 
assessments but payments for services furnished. See also Home 
Builders Ass'n of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo Cityy 28 Utah 2d 402, 
403 (1972). 
If the sewer service fees are indeed a tax, then Appellant 
admits that Section 78-12-31 should apply. But Salt Lake City 
Suburban Sanitary District, an improvement district, is not 
authorized by relevant statutory provision to enact revenue 
measures in the form of a tax. 
Therefore, Section 78-12-31 does not apply, Appellant's 
action was filed timely, and the decision of the trial court should 
be reversed. 
II 
RESPONDENT'S RUPP v. GRANTSVILLE/JENKINS V. SWAN NEXUS 
Respondent's argument is that: (1) in Rupp v. Grantsville 
City, 610 P2d 338 (1980) (see Appendix) this Court applied Section 
59-11-11 U.C.A., providing for payment of taxes under protest, to 
sewer CONNECTION fees, and in Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P2d 1145, this 
Court said that the six-month statute of limitations found in 
78-12-31 U.C.A. applies to Section 59-11-11 U.C.A.; therefore, (2) 
Appellant's Complaint is barred by the six-month statute of 
limitations. 
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The problem with this line of logic, creative though it 
may be, is that in Rupp the sewer connection fee was treated as a 
governmental exercise of the police powers of the City of 
Grantsville. 
This is not our fact situation here* 
I n
 Rapp* the City of Grantsville determined that a 
municipal sewer system was necessary for the continued health and 
posterity of the residents of Grantsville and therefore adopted an 
ordinance requiring mandatory connection of homes with the 
completed sewer system. Rupp refused to pay the fee and filed suit 
after his water service was disconnected by the City. 
The issues presented to the Court were: (a) whether the 
municipality acted beyond its authority in enacting the ordinance 
mandating connection to the new sewage system, and (b) whether the 
termination of Plaintiff's water service because of his failure to 
pay the initial connection fee constituted an unconstitutional 
deprivation of property without due process of law. This Court 
held that the Grantsville ordinance was a valid exercise of the 
police power of the City and therefore was enforceable against the 
Plaintiff. The Court elaborated on its treating of the sewer 
connection fee as a tax, in footnote 6, which states: 
Courts have generally recognized 
the proprietary character of the 
municipalities operation of a 
public utility such as a water or 
sewer system. (Citations 
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omitted.) However, while the 
operation of the utility is a 
proprietary activity the power to 
compel connection with the sewer 
system is a governmental exercise 
of the State police power. As the 
Idaho Supreme Court explained in 
Schmidt, supra: "There is no 
inconsistency between the holding 
herein that in the operation of 
the village exercises a 
proprietary function, and the 
holding that in requiring 
connections to be made with the 
sewage system the village is 
exercising its police power, which 
is a governmental function." 
(Citations omitted.) In the 
present situation the municipality 
is involved in both aspects of 
this dichotomy. Thus, while 
fulfilling a proprietary role in 
operating the waterworks the 
municipality is also employing its 
governmental powers to mandate 
connection with the new sewer 
system. (Citations omitted.) 
By citing Rupp in the case herein. Respondent is confusing 
the dichotomy between the proprietary role of an improvement 
district and the governmental role of a municipality. Inasmuch as 
the improvement district cannot levy taxes, Sections 59-11-11 and 
78-12-31, U.C.A. do not apply to sewer service fees and therefore 
not to the case herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants appeal should be granted on the basis that the 
trial court errored in applying the law of Sections 59-11-11 and 
78-12-31 U.C.A., and the cases of Rupp v. Grantsville City and 
Jenkins v. Swan. These Sections and cases apply to the 
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governmental police powers of a municipality. The present case 
deals with a sewer service fee, not taxes, imposed by an 
improvement district. The six-month statute of limitations imposed 
by Section 78-12-31, U.C.A., should be not applied as a bar to 
Appellant's complaint. 
The District Court's decision should be reversed, and the 
case remanded to the trial court for hearing a on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JERROLD S. JENSEN 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 200 
alt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 355-5490 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
Section 78-12-31 Utah Code Annotated 
Rupp. v. Grantsville City, 610 P2d 338 (1980) 
Section 78-12-31, Utah Code Annotated 
78-12-31. Within six months.—Within six months: 
An action against an officer, or an officer de facto: 
(1) To recover any goods, wares, merchandise or other property 
seized by any such officer in his official capacity as tax collector, or to 
recover the price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise or other 
personal property so seized, or for damages for the seizure, detention, 
sale of, or injury to, any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal 
property seized, or for damages done to any person or property in 
making any such seizure. 
(2) For money paid to any such officer under protest, or seized by 
such officer in his official capacity, as a collector of taxes, and which, it 
is claimed, ought to be refunded. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-31. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-27 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Applicability of section. 
This provision was not intended to 
limit time for commencement of action 
against city for money had and received 
by it in payment of void sprinkling tax 
paid under protest. Baleigh v. Salt Lake 
City, 17 TJ. 130, 53 P. 974, applying former 
statute. 
Action against secretary of state to 
recover taxes paid under unconstitutional 
statute was barred where not brought 
within six months. Sperry & Hutchinson 
Co. v. Mattson, 64 TJ. 214, 228 P. 755, 
applying former statute. 
Action for taxes paid to the state is 
limited to the six-month period available 
under this section. State v. District Court 
of Salt Lake County, 102 U. 284, 115 P. 
2d 913, applying former statute. For se-
quel to this case, see 102 U. 290, 128 P. 
2d 47L 
Collateral Eef exencea, 
Limitation of Actions<S=*34(3). 
53 C.JJ3. Limitations of Actions § 84. 
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George RUPP et al., Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
GRANTSVILLE CITY et al., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 16270. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 27, 1980. 
City residents brought action seeking 
declaration that certain city ordinances 
were unconstitutional. The Third District 
Court, Tooele County, Ernest F. Baldwin, 
J., dismissed the complaint, and plaintiffs 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, 
J., held that: (1) city's ordinance which 
required mandatory hook-up to municipal 
sewer system was a valid exercise of city's 
recognized police power, and (2) discontinu-
ation of plaintiffs' water service upon their 
failure to pay authorized connection fee af-
ter notice and an opportunity to reinstate 
the service by a conditional tender of mo-
nies owed prior to a formal judicial proceed-
ing was not arbitrary, capricious, or unjust, 
since procedures available to plaintiffs in-
sured notice of the claim and consequences 
of nonpayment and a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard in appropriate forum. 
Affirmed. 
1. Municipal Corporations c=270, 595, 597 
In Utah, municipalities are granted 
broad powers for the protection of the 
health and welfare of their residents, and 
among the powers is the statutory authori-
ty to establish and maintain public utilities 
for the benefit of those residents. U.C.A. 
1953, 10-8-15. 
2. Municipal Corporations o==595, 597 
Inherent in municipality's power to 
preserve and protect health and welfare of 
its residents is the authority to adopt ordi-
nances directed at the effectuation of that 
protection. U.C.A.1953, 10-8-38, 10-8-84; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14. 
3. Municipal Corporations 0=712 
City's ordinance which required manda-
tory hook-up to municipal sewer system was 
a valid exercise of city's recognized police 
power. U.C.A.1953, 10-8-38, 10-8-84; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14. 
4. Municipal Corporations c=>589 
Fact that legislature amended statute 
to include a specific express grant of power 
to municipalities to enact mandatory ordi-
nances was merely an express recognition 
of power implied in police powers previous-
ly held by municipalities, and was not a 
legislative grant of a new power not previ-
ously held by municipalities. U.C.A.1953, 
10 8 38. 
5. Municipal Corporations c=712 
While the operation of utility is a pro-
prietary activity, the power to compel con-
nection with sewer system is a governmen-
tal exercise of state police power. 
6. Constitutional Law c=>251, 251.5 
Due process is not a technical concept 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances which can be im-
prisoned within the treacherous limits of 
any formula; rather, the demands of due 
process rest on concept of basic fairness of 
procedure and demand a procedure appro-
priate to the case and just to the parties 
involved. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14. 
7. Waters and Water Courses c=203(13) 
Discontinuation of plaintiffs' water ser-
vice upon their failure to pay authorized 
connection fee after notice and an opportu-
nity to reinstate the service by a conditional 
tender of monies owed prior to a formal 
judicial proceeding was not arbitrary, capri-
cious, or unjust, since procedures available 
to plaintiffs insured notice of the claim and 
consequences of nonpayment and a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard in appropri-
ate forum. Const, art. 1, § 7; U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14. 
Phil L. Hansen of Hansen & Hansen, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
RUPP v. GRAN 
Cite as, Utah, 
Edward A. Watson, Tooele County Atty., 
Tooele, H. Wayne Green, Deputy Tooele 
County Atty., Grantsville, for defendants 
and respondents. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
The plaintiffs bring this appeal from the 
District Court's dismissal of their suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs 
sought a declaration from the District 
Court that certain ordinances passed by the 
Grantsville City Commission were unconsti-
tutional, and in excess of their statutory 
authority. They also requested injunctive 
relief from the mandatory aspects of the 
ordinance in question. We uphold the Dis-
trict Court's dismissal. All statutory refer-
ences are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. No costs awarded. 
Following a determination by the elected 
officials of Grantsville City that a municipal 
sewer system was necessary for the contin-
ued health and prosperity of the residents 
of the city, an ordinance was adopted in 
1969. It required mandatory connection 
with the completed system. This ordinance 
was enacted to facilitate the procurement 
of certain federal funds, to defray the cost 
of construction. In fact, mandatory hook-
up to the new system was a condition prece-
dent to the receipt of the federal grants. 
After the federal grants were obtained, 
the citizens of Grantsville approved, 
through a special election, the issuance of 
municipal bonds to cover the initial con-
struction and maintenance expenses of the 
proposed system. Prior to the bond elec-
tion, the city officials circulated a leaflet to 
the citizenry which outlined the approxi-
mate costs of the new system, and reflected 
the proposed application of various monies 
collected. Among the amounts detailed in 
the flyer was an initial $250 charge for each 
residence connected to the system. That 
sum was to be used to reduce the total 
amount financed by bonds. 
Subsequently, bids on the various aspects 
of the -construction were submitted, con-
tracts were awarded, and the construction 
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of the facility commenced. During the con-
struction, the city officials discovered the 
consulting engineers who designed the sys-
tem had mistakenly excluded 18,000 linear 
feet of necessary sewer laterals. To allevi-
ate the financial problems created by this 
mistake the city officials determined the 
original connection fee should be increased 
from $250 to $300. However, before imple-
menting this adjustment, the officials sent 
letters to the residents of Grantsville advis-
ing them 0^ the mistake. The officials also 
advertised, and held a public meeting con-
cerning the problem. The meeting was 
well attended. Following open discussion 
on the matter a vote was taken which en-
dorsed the proposed solution. 
The plaintiffs in the present matter are a 
number of named residents of Grantsville 
who refused to pay the connection fee. 
Following several letters notifying the 
plaintiffs of their failure to pay the fee and 
the consequences of continuing non-compli-
ance the city officials discontinued water 
service to the plaintiffs' residences pursuant 
to a city ordinance allowing such actions for 
the enforcement of the mandatory sewer 
connection ordinance. 
After reinstatement of their water serv-
ices,1 the plaintiffs filed suit in the District 
Court seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief from the enforcement of the manda-
tor}' hook-up ordinance, and the assessment 
of the associated fee. After a hearing on 
the merits, the District Court dismissed the 
plaintiffs' suit. 
On apjxjal the plaintiffs present various 
nonmeritorious claims which will not be dis-
cussed. Rather, we direct our attention to 
the plaintiffs' contentions; (a) the munici-
pality acted beyond its authority in enact-
ing the ordinance mandating connection to 
the new sewage system, and (b) the termi-
nation of plaintiffs' water service because 
of their failure to pay the initial connection 
fee constituted an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of property without due process of law. 
[lf2] In Utah, municipalities are grant-
ed broad powers for the protection of the 
1. Upon payment of the mandatory fee the plaintiffs' water services were reinstated. 
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health and welfare of their residents. 
Among these powers is the statutory au-
thority to establish and maintain public 
utilities for the benefit of those residents.2 
Inherent in the power to preserve and pro-
tect the health and welfare of municipal 
residents is the authority to adopt ordi-
nances directed at the effectuation of that 
protection. This general grant of police 
power is codified in 10-8-84 which pro-
vides: 
"They [municipalities] may pass all or-
dinances and rules and make all regula-
tions, not repugnant to law, necessary for 
carrying into effect or discharging all 
powers and duties conferred by this chap-
ter, and such as are necessary and proper 
to provide for the safety and preserve the 
health and promote the prosperity . 
comfort and convenience of the city and 
inhabitants thereof, and for the protec-
tion of property therein; . ." 
The scope of police power conferred on 
municipal governments by the requirements 
incident to effective protection of the 
health and welfare of their citizenry are 
reflected in statutes such as 10-8-84. The 
relationship between a mandatory connec-
tion ordinance and this police power was 
recognized in Bigler v. Greenwood} In Bi-
gler, this Court in upholding the mandatory 
connection ordinance explained: 
2. 10-8-15 proclaims: "They (municipal 
governments) may construct or authorize the 
construction of waterworks within or without 
the city limits, and for the purpose of maintain-
ing and protecting the same from injury and 
the water from pollution their jurisdiction shall 
extend over the territory occupied by such 
works, and over all reservoirs, streams, canals, 
ditches, pipes and drains used in and necessary 
for the construction, maintenance and opera-
tion of the same, and over the stream or source 
from which the water is taken, . . They 
may enact ail ordinances and regulations nec-
essary to carry the power herein conferred into 
effect, . 
3. See Bigler v. Greenwood, 123 Utah 60. 254 
P.2d 843 (1953). 
4. The fact the legislature amended 10-8-38 to 
include a specific express grant of power to 
enact mandatory ordinances is merely an ex-
press recognition of power implied in the police 
powers previously held by the municipalities. 
"Such an ordinance is undeniably pro-
posed to protect the health and welfare 
and is therefor a valid exercise of author-
ity expressly conferred under the police 
power." 
[3,4] There is nothing in the present 
situation which requires a retreat from that 
position.4 The Grantsville ordinance in 
question is a valid exercise of the munici-
palities recognized police power and there-
fore is enforceable against the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs aver, however, the city's 
enforcement procedure represents an un-
constitutional deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. Concomitant to the 
mandatory connection ordinance was an or-
dinance providing for the discontinuation of 
domestic water service to the residents 
which failed to pay the initial connection 
fee or the monthly use fees. 
The plaintiffs complain termination of 
their water service without a hearing de-
prived them of property without the requi-
site due process of law. We do not agree 
with this conclusion. 
[5] Several questions arise from this 
contention including the characterization of 
municipal water services as an entitlement 
constituting property under the purview of 
due process protection5 of the Constitution 
of Utah, Article I, Section 7, and the appli-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
and is not, as the plaintiffs contend, a legisla-
tive grant of a new power not previously held 
by the cities. 
5. The plaintiffs rely heavily on Koger v. Guari-
no, 412 F.Supp. 1375 (D.C.Pa.I976). In Koger 
the plaintiffs brought a Section 1983 action 
alleging the municipalities termination of water 
services for failure to pay past charges without 
notice and hearing constituted a denial of due 
process. The court reasoned a water user has 
a legitimate claim of entitlement continued 
water service which is a property interest pro-
tected by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Other district courts have 
reached similar conclusions. See Bradford v. 
Edelstem. 467 F.Supp. 1361, 1376. 1377 (D.C. 
Tex. 1979); However, this conclusion was seri-
ously questioned by the first appellate court to 
consider it. See Sterling v. Village of May-
wood, 579 F.2d 1350, 1354-1355 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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municipalities engaged in the operation of 
such public utilities.8 However, in the 
present case the resolution of these issues is 
not required because the procedure availa-
ble to the plaintiffs in relation to the dis-
continuation of their water services was 
sufficient to provide due process of law. 
Specifically, prior to termination, the 
plaintiffs received several letters notifying 
them of the consequences of their continu-
ing failure to comply with the terms of the 
ordinance in question. Thus, they were af-
forded adequate notice of the imminent ac-
tion. The plaintiffs complain, however, 
that the failure of the municipality to grant 
them a pretermination hearing abridged 
their due process right. 
[6] However, "due process" is not a 
technical concept with a fixed content unre-
lated to time, place and circumstances 
which can be imprisoned within the treach-
erous limits of any formula.7 Rather the 
6. Courts have generally recognized the proprie-
tary character of the municipalities operation 
of a public utility such as a water or sewer 
system. See Egelhoff v. Ogden City, 71 Utah 
511. 267 P. 1011 (1928); Hunke v. Foote, 84 
Idaho 391, 373 P.2d 322 (1962); Schmidt v. 
Kimberiy, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P2d 515 (1953); 
Sharp v. Hail, 198 Okl. 678. 181 P2d 972 
(1947); However, while the operation of the 
utility is a proprietary activity the power to 
compel connection with the sewer system is a 
governmental exercise of the State police pow-
er. As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in 
Schmidt, supra: "There is no inconsistency be-
tween the holding herein that in the operation 
of a public utility the village exercises a pro-
prietary function, and the holding that in re-
qu\nng connections to be made w\th the sew-
age system the village is exercising its police 
power, which is a governmental function." at 
524. Cf. Egelhoff v. Ogden City, supra at 1012; 
Brummit v. Ogden Waterworks Co., 33 Utah 
289, 93 P 828 (1908); Hunke v. Foote, supra, at 
325, ("In its governmental capacity, it may 
command; in its private character as a collec-
tion of individuals, it must sometimes barter 
and bargain."); In the present situation the 
municipality is involved in both aspects of this 
dichotomy. Thus, while fulfilling a proprietary 
role in operating the waterworks the munici-
pality is also employing its governmental pow-
ers to mandate connection with the new sewer 
system. See generally Jackson v Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S 345, 95 S Ct. 449. 42 
L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); But cf. Lafayette v. Louisi-
demands of due process rest on the concept 
of basic fairness of procedure and demand a 
procedure appropriate to the case and just 
to the parties involved.8 
[7] The protections embodied in the re-
quirement of an opportunity to be heard do 
not necessarily require a pretermination 
hearing. In the present situation there is 
no question of fact requiring resolution at a 
hearing prior to termination of the water 
service. The amount due and owing is es-
tablished and the only question involved is 
the legality of the ordinance.9 The appro-
priate forum for a determination of the 
authority of the municipality to enact and 
enforce the ordinance in question is the 
courts of this State. Also in the present 
situation, access to formal judicial proceed-
ings is facilitated by 59-11 1110 which al-
lows the plaintiff to tender the payments 
required under protest and secure the con-
tinuation of water services while insuring a 
ana Power & light Co., 435 U.S 389, 98 S.Ct. 
1123. 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978). 
7. See Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123. 71 S.Ct. 624. 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
8. See the Japanese Immigrant case, 189 US. 
86, 47 LEd. 721. 23 S.Ct. 611 (1903). 
9. This is not a situation where a bona fide 
dispute exists concerning the amount due or 
the liability of the plaintiff for payment. But 
see Dodd v. City of Atlanta, 154 Ga. 33. 113 
S.E. 166 (1922). 
10. 59 11 11 provides: 
"Payment under protest—Action to recover. 
—In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other 
demands for public revenue which is deemed 
unlawful by the party whose property is thus 
taxed, or from whom such tax or license is 
demanded or enforced, such party may pay 
under protest such tax or license, or any part 
thereof deemed unlawful, to the officers desig-
nated and authorized by law to collect the 
same; and thereupon the party so paving or his 
legal representative may bring an action in the 
tax division of the appropriate district court 
against the officer to whom said tax or license 
was paid, or against the state, county, munici-
pality or other taxing unit on whose behalf the 
same was collected, to recover said tax or 
license or any portion thereof paid under pro-
test." 
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subsequent judicial proceeding in the mat-
ter.11 
The discontinuation of the plaintiffs' 
water service upon their failure to pay the 
authorized connection fee after notice and 
an opportunity to reinstate the service in 
question by a conditional tender of monies 
owed prior to a formal judicial proceeding 
was not arbitrary, capricious, or unjust. 
Rather, the procedures available to the 
plaintiffs insured notice of the claim and 
consequences of nonpayment and a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard in an appro-
priate forum. Therefore the demands of 
due process were fulfilled in this case.12 
After thorough consideration of the 
plaintiffs' other points on appeal we con-
clude they are without merit. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and HALL, WILKINS 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
v. 
Jacob J. LAMORIE, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 165:14. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 28, 1980. 
Defendant was convicted in the Sev-
enth District Court, Grand County. Boyd 
11. The plaintiffs failure to employ this protec-
tion does not diminish its procedural fairness. 
The fact the municipality accepted various pay-
ment schemes in relation to the mandatory fee 
also supplements the protections embodied in 
59 11 11 by alleviating any economic hardship 
incident to the initial payment. 
12. See Davidson v. New Orleans. 9<i U.S. 97. 24 
L.Ed. 616 (1877); In Davidson the United 
States Supreme Court explained: ". 
That whenever by the laws of a State, or by 
State authority, a tax. assessment, servitude, or 
other burden is imposed upon property for the 
Bunnell, J., of possession of a dangerous 
weapon while on parole for a felony, and he 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., 
held that: (1) the fact that defendant was 
on parole in another state did not permit 
the inference that defendant had been con-
victed for a felony; (2) certification of the 
county court records showing defendant's 
prior convictions by a notary public did not 
satisfy the requirement for documentary 
authentication, so that the records were not 
competent evidence; and (3) the prosecu-
tion was entitled to a further opportunity 
to prove the charge in a new trial and 
acquittal of defendant was not mandated. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred and filed opinion 
in which Wiikins, J., joined. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
1. Weapons C=>17(2) 
Fact that defendant, charged with pos-
session of dangerous weapon while on pa-
role for felony, was on parole in another 
state did not permit inference that such 
parole W;LS for a felony, where Parole Board 
of other state was empowered to grant 
paroles to imprisoned felons and imprisoned 
misdemeanants so that inference was equal-
ly justified that defendant was a paroled 
misdemeanant as that he was a paroled 
felon. (Per Hall, J., with one Justice 
concurring and two Justices specially con-
curring.) U.C.A.1953, 76 10-503(2); C.R.S. 
73, 16-11-301(1, 2); C.R.S. '73, 17-2-
201(3)(c) (Repealed). 
public use. whether it be for the whole State or 
of some more limited portion of the communi-
ty, and those laws provide for a mode of con-
firming or contesting the charge thus imposed 
in the ordinary courts of justice, with such 
notice to the person, or such proceeding in 
regard to the property as is appropriate to the 
nature of the case, the judgment in such pro-
ceedings cannot be said to deprive th? owner of 
his property without due process of law. how-
ever obnoxious it may be to other objections." 
at 104 105. 
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